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Figure 1: Mockup of an Android
lock screen using a reactive
security message that reports the
last unlock time. In addition, the
reason why the user has to enter
the PIN instead of using the
fingerprint is displayed.
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Abstract
Nowadays, most mobile devices support biometric au-
thentication schemes like fingerprint or face unlock. How-
ever, these probabilistic mechanisms can only be activated
in combination with a second alternative factor, usually
knowledge-based authentication. In this paper, we show
that this aspect can be exploited in a bypass attack. In
this bypass attack, the attacker forces the user to “bypass”
the biometric authentication by, for example, resetting the
phone. This forces the user to enter an easy-to-observe
passcode instead. We present the threat model and provide
preliminary results of an online survey. Based on our re-
sults, we discuss potential countermeasures. We conclude
that better feedback design and security-optimized fallback
mechanisms can help further improve the overall security of
mobile unlock mechanisms while preserving usability.
Introduction and Background
Mobile devices store a lot of potentially sensitive informa-
tion, e.g., in the form of e-mails, pictures, or contact data. A
lock screen, which requires user authentication, is often the
last barrier of protection from unauthorized access. While
knowledge-based approaches (e.g., PIN) have been the
quasi-standard for many years, biometric approaches (e.g.,
fingerprint) are increasingly employed as a more usable al-
ternative. This can be explained by recent research which
shows that users unlock their mobile devices several times
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an hour [7], which underlines the importance of usability
in terms of speed and error rate. Indeed, in comparison to
their to knowledge-based counterparts, biometric authenti-
cation schemes are faster and easier to use [3]. Biometric
authentication is also superior in terms of security as it re-
sists many attacks that knowledge-based schemes are vul-
nerable to, such as observation [9], smudge [2] and thermal
attacks [1].
Figure 2: Notification of Android 8
and iOS 12.1.2 on an iPhone 5s
and X if the fingerprint was not
correctly identified 5 times in a row
or the device was unable to identify
the users’ face. We assume that a
more detailed message (e.g.,
“fingerprint authentication failed 5
times in a row in the last 5
minutes”) could improve both the
usability of the system and the
security consciousness of the user.
Nevertheless, biometric authentication does not come with-
out limitations. Previous work showed that biometric au-
thentication can be vulnerable to sophisticated camera-
based smudge attacks, and sometimes suffers from recog-
nition errors when the user’s features are distorted or oc-
cluded (e.g., using TouchID with dirty or wet fingers, or us-
ing FaceID when only part of the face is visible).
We identify an additional vulnerability in biometric authen-
tication that has not been investigated in prior research.
Namely, because of their probabilistic nature, mobile bio-
metric authentication always requires a second determin-
istic mode, which in turn reduces security. For example,
Android and iOS require users to set a knowledge-based
password (e.g., PIN or Lock Pattern) whenever they choose
biometric authentication as the main unlocking mecha-
nism1. We argue that this is a security issue, as lock screens
that support multiple authentication modes can only be as
secure as the weakest mechanism provided.
In this paper, we show that the current lock screen imple-
mentations are still prone to observation attacks, as users
can easily be tricked into using the knowledge-based fac-
tor. For example, an attacker could repeatedly push their
1 iOS: https://www.apple.com/business/site/docs/iOS_Security_
Guide.pdf
Android: https://source.android.com/security/encryption/full-disk.
html
finger against a user’s fingerprint sensor to force the system
to require a knowledge-based password, which in turn can
be easily uncovered via observation, thermal or smudge
attacks. Therefore, we argue that there is little need for ed-
ucated attacks on biometrics, as long as the provided alter-
native mode (e.g., PIN) is still vulnerable.
We discuss our threat model and present several attack
vectors which exploit the human factor in combination with
flawed interface design (i.e., the lack of feedback). We
demonstrate that current mobile phones can be quickly ma-
nipulated in a way that bypasses biometric authentication
and thereby forcing users to enter their passcode. The re-
sults of an online survey (N=200) indicate, that most users
do not question switches from biometric to knowledge-
based authentication, which suggests that users are vul-
nerable to said threat. Based on our results, we discuss
potential countermeasures and illustrate directions for fu-
ture work. We propose small changes to the user interface
(i.e., provide feedback on mode switches) which could pre-
vent the bypass attack. Furthermore, we highlight the need
to revisit previously discussed security-optimized (e.g.,
observation-resistant) authentication mechanisms in the
light of the new context (i.e., fallback authentication).
Threat Model
In our threat model, we assume that the attacker is in the
vicinity of the victim and has short-term access to the vic-
tim’s mobile device. The victim’s device is configured with
a biometric lock screen such as fingerprint, as a fallback
mechanism, the victim has configured PIN.
The attacker does not know the victim’s PIN. Once the vic-
tim’s device is unattended, the attacker prepares the device
in a way that a PIN-based authentication will be required
for the next unlock. This can be done by triggering 5 unsuc-
cessful biometric authentication attempts2. As soon as the
victim tries to unlock their phone, the system asks for the
PIN. Without questioning the reason, the victim provides
their PIN-code. The attacker then observes the entered
PIN, gets hold of the device (e.g., when the user leaves it
unattended), and then unlocks the device after switching
to the fallback screen. In this scenario, there is no need to
break the biometric factor. Since the device does not pro-
vide any information about switches between factors, the
victim remains unaware that someone tampered with their
phone.
Practical Execution of the Bypass Attack
In contrast to previous elaborated attacks on biometric sen-
sors, we investigated non-detectable low-cost approaches
which force the victim to bypass the biometric unlock and
enter the fallback authentication code. Based on the review
of the currently deployed hardware and current lock screen
implementations, we outline software-based and hardware-
based attacks.
Figure 3: Home button covered
with lip balm to prevent the
fingerprint sensor from recognizing
the users’ fingerprint.
iPhone Android
prim. sec. prim. sec.
PIN 27 51 30 56
Pattern 19 31 0 7
Password 6 32 8 22
Fingerprint 42 21 55 23
Face unlock 2 5 6 9
Other 4 4 1 2
Total 100 144 100 119
Table 1: The distribution of both
device-groups divided by the
primary and secondary method as
reported by the participants.
I know the reason why the mobile device 
decided to ask me for passcode/PIN 
instead of accepting my fingerprint/face.
5435027137
1 - Never 2 - Rarely 3 - Sometimes
4 - Very often 5 - Always I don’t know
I chose an easy to remember PIN/Pattern/
Password because I'm using biometric 
authentication (fingerprint or face unlock) 
most of the time.
14634162226
1 - Strongly disagree 2
3 - Neutral 4
5 - Strongly agree Does not apply
Figure 4: Likert scale answers of
the survey.
Software-based Attacks
Software-based attacks exploit the implementation of cur-
rent lock screens. For example, current iPhones require the
passcode 1) after reboot, and 2) after five failed biometric
attempts. This aspect can be exploited by an attacker to
actively require users to enter their passcode; the attacker
can switch off / restart the device or perform five failed at-
tempts using their own finger or face (depending on the
used mechanism). As illustrated in Figure 2, current mobile
devices provide only limited feedback on mode switches.
Therefore, users are likely to remain unaware of the attack.
2https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204587
Hardware-based Attacks
Attackers can actively manipulate the biometric sensor.
We performed a number of experiments with the iPhone
5s and explored different ways. We found that applying
a) greasy lip balm or b) some drops of water prevents the
sensors from working. While this method may be more eye-
catching, it is an easy and direct way to force users to enter
their passcode.
User Behavior and Risk Perception
To gather preliminary results on the risk of the presented
threat model, we used Amazons MTurk to survey 200 US-
citizens (100 Android, 100 iPhone) about their unlock mech-
anisms. The survey took about 5 minutes and was compen-
sated with 0.75$. We were interested in the participants’
understanding of mode switches. This means, if they un-
derstand why their device is requiring a passcode. In ad-
dition, we asked how often they leave their smartphone
unattended and if the use of biometrics affects the choice
of passcodes.
Table 1 provides self-reported data on primary and sec-
ondary authentication. In the survey, we asked the partic-
ipants which methods they “usually used to unlock” (pri-
mary) and “all other activated unlock mechanisms” they
have (secondary). 145 participants (61 iPhone, 84 Android)
reported to use fingerprint or face unlock as primary or sec-
ondary method. Please note that in this particular case
“primary” and “secondary” was related to the participant’s
perceived usage of the respective method.
We used a 5-point scale (1 - Never to 5 - Always) to ask
biometric users “how often they know the reason why their
mobile device asked them for their PIN or passcode instead
of accepting their biometric login”. 97 of 145 ( 67%), as
seen in Figure 4 reported, that they do not always under-
stand the reasons of mode switches, seven iPhone users
acknowledged that they can never figure out the reason.
This result indicates that users are likely to remain unaware
of malicious mode switches. In addition, we asked to what
extent the participants agree to the statement “I chose an
easy to remember PIN/Pattern/Password because I’m using
biometric authentication (fingerprint or face unlock) most of
the time.”. As seen in Figure 4, we found a trend indicating
that users select weaker passwords when they use biomet-
ric authentication. 80 of 145 ( 55%) participants agreed that
they deliberately chose an easy password. We asked how
often the participants leave their phone unattended when
e.g., going to the rest rooms. 135 of 200 (67.5%) reported
that they occasionally or often do this, which makes short-
term access for the attacker possible.
Potential Countermeasures
Based on our preliminary results, we propose to investigate
the effectiveness of the following countermeasures.
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
WARNING:POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
The ECDSA host key for server has
changed, and the key for the
corresponding IP address 192.168.0.1
is unchanged. This could either mean
that DNS SPOOFING is happening or the
IP address for the host and its host
key have changed at the same time.
Figure 5: Warning message of
SSH when the IP-address of a
known server has changed.
Similarly, we recommend showing
users a warning message when
biometric authentication fails to
improve their security
consciousness.
Improved Interface Design
Most users do not question the fact that a passcode is re-
quired. Our preliminary results indicate that the system
state of current lock screens is not always easy to assess.
We argue that future work needs to investigate if the unlock
screen can be improved in a way that better communicates
the current system state. Following the usability heuris-
tics by Jakob Nielsen [8], we recommend to provide more
information about mode switches between primary and
secondary authentication. Figure 1 shows an example of
how such feedback could look like. We would recommend
to inform the user about the last unlock event, maybe only
when it seems necessary, e.g., determined by uncharacter-
istic behavior. We assume that this information could help
the user to discover ongoing security breaches (cf., threat
model). Similar reactive security measures are already in
use in OpenSSH (see Figure 5) or in online banking plat-
forms.
Improved Knowledge-based Authentication
Our preliminary findings indicate that biometric authenti-
cation schemes are often used as the primary authenti-
cation method. As a consequence, the knowledge-based
approach is used less frequently. We argue that this aspect
changes the requirements for feasible knowledge-based
authentication mechanisms. We assume that the new con-
text of use renders efficiency (i.e., input time) less important
and makes memorability and effectiveness more important.
Previous research has proposed a plethora of knowledge-
based authentication mechanisms which were optimized
to resist different types of side-channel attacks like obser-
vation attacks [5], smudge attacks [2] or thermal attacks
[1]. While these mechanisms (e.g., [4, 6]) were shown to
be more secure, they were often too slow to be used as a
primary (i.e., most used) mobile authentication method. We
recommend to review previous work in the light of the new
use case (i.e., as a fallback authentication). We assume
that using such security-optimized authentication schemes
becomes feasible in the new context and would improve the
overall security of the device.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we discussed a new threat model, a bypass
attack. By performing a bypass attack, the attacker is forc-
ing the user to “bypass” biometric authentication and to use
an easy-to-observe knowledge-based mode instead. Based
on the preliminary results of an online survey, we discussed
potential countermeasures which need to be investigated in
future work. We argued that the overall security of the lock
screens could be improved by 1) providing more feedback
to the user and by 2) deploying security-optimized (e.g.,
observation-resistant) knowledge-based mechanisms.
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